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"BUT I KNOW IT WHEN I SEE IT": 
NATURAL LAW AND FORMALISM 
W. Bryson* 
NATURAL LAW IN COURT: A HISTORY OF LEGAL THEORY IN PRACTICE 
By R. H. Helmholz. Harvard University Press, 2015. 260 pp. $45.00 
LAW'S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC 
TURN TO HISTORY 
By David M. Rabban. Cambridge University Press, 2013. 582 pp. $33.99 
Professor Helmholz writes with knowledge and authority on 
the use of natural law in the courts of law in early modern 
rope, England, and the United States. This necessarily includes a 
discussion of the teaching of natural law to the students who 
would in due course practice in those courts and sit on those 
benches.1 It is apparent that natural law was not taught in 
schools of law systematically, as it was in the schools of philoso-
phy and theology. Rather, it was peripherally introduced at the 
beginning of a student's legal education in order to anchor the 
law and the study thereof in the broader world. 2 This is logically 
necessary when the theoretical law is applied to the facts of the 
so called "real world." The law may or may not be a metaphysical 
construct, but it certainly does concern itself with the world as a 
method-the preferred method-of conflict resolution. 
* Blackstone Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. LL.D., 2013, 
University of Cambridge; Ph.D., 1972, University of Cambridge; LL.M., 1968, University 
of Virginia School of Law; LL.B., 1967, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1963, Hampden-Sydney 
College. 
1. R.H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL LAW IN COURT: A HISTORY OF LEGAL THEORY IN 
PRACTICE 13-40, 82-93, 127-41 (2015). 
2. Id. at 17, 89-90, 133-34. 
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,_,_.._,,_,.._u,_vuo shows convincingly that natural law ideas 
were m the backs the minds of the legal professionals in the 
early modern period of Europe and the western hemisphere. Oth-
er sources of law were more often resorted to, but that was 
because positive and municipal law were more explicit and better 
defined. 
Professor Rabban focuses on legal education and legal thought 
the late nineteenth century. He discusses, in particular, the le-
gal accomplishments of the Harvard Law School under Dean C. 
Langdell his immediate colleagues and followers. 3 These 
accomplishments were, my own opinion, primarily the arena 
legal scholarship. The Harvard Law School professors wrote 
legal treatises that were useful not only to their students but 
more importantly to Anglo-American legal profession in gen-
eral.4 
Professor Rabban's careful and thorough study of these men 
places them in the broader tradition of natural 
law. They were called formalists, but, it appears to me that for-
"''-"--'--'-"AH is simply the putting of the natural law into legal prac-
tice. Thus, natural law is the organizing principle underlying 
their legal treatises. 
this book is to demonstrate that the nineteenth 
century formalists were not at all the tools of the contemporary 
industrialists. They most certainly did not champion the ideas of 
laissez faire capitalism that was the economic model at 
their although they were unfairly characterized as doing so 
their successors, Dean Roscoe Pound and his followers. 5 It is, 
of course, human nature to push the older generation out of the 
way so that the younger generation can take their place. This is 
perhaps necessary if any progress is to be made. Challenging old-
er ideas is a good thing if it is done honestly. But mindlessly to 
cast aside the tried and true is not a good thing. Not all change is 
progress. History supplies many unfortunate examples of major 
steps Professor Rabban corrects the misperceptions by 
the so-called legal realists as to the positions of the legal formal-
ists. 
3. DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW'S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE 
TRANBATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 325-80 (2013). 
4. See, e.g., C.C. LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (1905); C. C. 
LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING (1877); AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW 
OF TRUSTS (1939); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT 
THE COMMON LAW (1898); SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920). 
5. RABBAN, supra note 3, at 423-30, 474-77. 
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the case of v. 6 as to pornog-
not define it clearly, observed, I 
it when I see it." Perhaps it is not appropriate to speak of pornog-
law the same article, but 
have the ring of to those who have the grace to believe 
something without fully understanding 
Both Professor Helmholz and Professor Rabban know 
law and formalism are. However, neither scholar pre-
sumes to give an airtight definition. And is 
fessor Helmholz ends his book with a quotation 
Aquinas, who, with humility, acknowledges his 
understanding of natural law. 7 
Perhaps natural law is God's law. so, beings cannot 
fully know it, since creatures cannot fully know their creator. I 
am neither a theologian nor a philosopher, nor will I attempt a 
definition of natural However, I will observe that those 
than me have opposed natural to the general law of 
the municipal law of a specific nation. Thus natural 
been opposed to the positive law. This, however, is not to say they 
are always conflict. Perhaps, in the ideal world, they ...,,nu..._,,,..,_,_, 
We can let the philosophers argue about the "ought" and 
We can let the legal realists carry the ideas of Jeremy 
about the positive law to extremes. We can let the theologians 
and the atheists argue over whether there is nothing outside 
human existence. However, before Bentham, lawyers not 
think that way. Before Bentham all lawyers believed 
was something above human being and experience, and this was 
and is natural law. It is something that defines the goodness 
the positive law. Exactly what that is, I do not know. But I 
it when I see it. 
What is law, anyway? It is a body of principles governs. 
The opposite of law is anarchy, where the strong devour 
weak. The "law of the jungle" is not law, but power. So the power-
ful make law to serve their own power, but disguise power as 
This is positive law, both case law and statute law. It is the power 
of the sovereign, however one might define the term sovereign. 
Under positive law, it is lawful for the powerful to oppress 
6. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
7. HELMHOLZ, supra note 1, at 178 (paraphrasing Thomas Aquinas's assertion that 
"the more one descended into details and consequences, the more qualifications one was 
forced to admit"). We might further paraphrase Aquinas as "the devil is in the details." 
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weak and for the big fish to eat the little fish. But we have a 
sense of right and wrong which is different sometimes from the 
positive law. This sense of right is a knowledge of natural law. 
Those without a conscience-sociopaths-do not see natural law. 
And even though I cannot define natural law in its breadth or in 
its details, I know it when I see it. The research and scholarship 
of Professor Helmholz and Professor Rab ban are affirmative steps 
in the clarification of this subject. They, too, know it when they 
see it. 
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